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1 Introduction
This study examines the role of governance in modulating the effect of capital flight on 
industrialisation in African countries. It is motivated by three main factors, namely the 
(i) growing trend of capital flight in Africa; (ii) relevance of governance in dampening 
negative macroeconomic signals such as capital flight; and (iii) lagging position of Africa 
in industrialisation.1
First, as documented by Boyce (2012) who have provided an update on estimates 
of capital flight, over the past decades, Africa has experienced substantial capital 
outflows. For example, approximately 814 billion US Dollars (in constant of 2010 
US Dollars) was lost by 33 sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries during the period 
1970–2010. The lost sum to capital flight is higher than foreign direct investment 
and foreign aid which during the same period stood at respectively 306 billion and 
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1 In this study, we are not assessing the role of a policy variable (e.g. governance) in modulating the effect of another 
policy variable (such as domestic investment) on industrialisation. On the contrary, we are assessing the role of a policy 
variable (e.g. governance) in modulating the effect of a policy syndrome (such as capital flight) on industrialisation. We 
are aware of the fact that the channel of domestic investment could lead to more feasible results. However, consistent 
with the motivation of the study, we are concerned about capital flight as a policy syndrome. Nonetheless, we have con-
sidered domestic investment as a potential channel in a robustness check and could not establish significant and feasible 
results.
The concept of governance used in the study is not specifically tied to industrial governance. Good governance indi-
cators from the World Bank affect both capital flight and doing business conditions that are potentially positive for 
industrialisation. Hence, we are not concerned about industrial channels through which governance can mitigate the 
negative impact of capital flight on industrialisation. Nine main good governance channels are explored in the study. 
These include political stability, “voice & accountability”, political governance, government effectiveness, regulation qual-
ity, economic governance, corruption-control, rule of law and institutional governance.
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659 billion US Dollars. This mismatch is important because lack of finance has been 
established to be a principal constraint to the development of the continent (Asongu 
2013; Adu and Asamoah 2016; Charles and Mori 2016; Nyasha and Odhiambo 2017; 
Amponsah 2017; Danquah et al. 2017; Asongu and Odhiambo 2019a).
Second, good governance has been documented to, inter alia improve the efficient 
allocation of resources (Fonchingong 2014), consolidate the foundations of social 
change (Efobi 2015), decrease capital flight (Asongu and Nwachukwu 2017) and boost 
industrialisation (Nobuyuki 2010). Hence, this study is particularly relevant in the 
light of Africa’s lagging position in industrialisation.
Third, compared to other world regions, Africa is substantially lagging in terms 
of industrialisation. The comparatively slow progress towards industrialisation in 
the continent has been traceable to a number of factors, including (i) poor skills, 
infrastructure and investment climate (Page 2012; Gui-Diby and Renard 2015) and 
(ii) shortage of the investment capital required to fund the industrialisation process 
(Tuomi 2011; Darley 2012; Tibebe and Mollick 2017; Nukpezah and Blankson 2017; 
Asongu and Odhiambo 2020; Asongu et al. 2019).
As far as we have reviewed, there is currently no study that has investigated how 
governance modulates the effect of capital flight on industrialisation. Hence, the posi-
tioning of this study departs from the broader contemporary literature on capital 
flight in Africa. The strand of the literature closest to this positioning has established 
capital flight to originate from poor governance (Christensen 2011; Gankou et  al. 
2016; Asongu and Nwachukwu 2017). Moreover, whilst there is a substantial body 
of literature on governance (Musila and Sigué 2010; Kangoye 2013) and capital flight 
(Ndiaye and Siri 2016; Mpenya et al. 2016; Asongu and Amankwah-Amoah 2018) in 
Africa, we know very little about how governance modulates the effect of capital flight 
on macroeconomic outcomes. We improve the extant literature by focusing on indus-
trialisation as a macroeconomic outcome owing to the growing relevance of African 
industrialisation in policy and academic circles (Asche and Grimm 2007; Tchamyou 
2017; Diao et al. 2017; Ssozi et al. 2019). To make this assessment, governance indica-
tors are bundled and unbundled. The motivation for bundling governance indicators 
builds on evolving paradigms in the conception, definition and measurement of gov-
ernance (Asongu 2016). For example, it is inappropriate to employ the term “political 
governance” unless the variable underlying the term is a composite measurement of 
“voice and accountability” and “political stability/non-violence”.
The positioning of the research also departs from contemporary African develop-
ment literature which has largely focused on, inter alia: nexuses between finance, 
remittances and industrialisation (Efobi et al. 2019); remittances, the diffusion of infor-
mation and industrialisation (Asongu and Odhiambo 2020); the importance of govern-
ance in development outcomes (Pelizzo and Nwokora 2016, 2018; Pelizzo et al. 2016); 
linkages between trade and industrialisation (Kaplinsky and Morris 2019; Oloruntoba 
and Tsowou 2019); green industrialisation (Okereke et al. 2019) and financial reforms 
as the drivers of industrialisation (Folarin 2019). The rest of the study is structured 
as follows: Section 2 discusses the theoretical underpinnings and testable hypotheses. 
The data and methodology are covered in Sect. 3, whilst Sect. 4 presents the empirical 
results and discussion. Section 5 concludes with future research directions.
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2  Intuitions and testable hypotheses
Consistent with Naude et  al. (2013) and Efobi et  al. (2019), industrialisation can be 
defined as a socio-economic process of quick transformation within the manufacturing 
sector in relation to a plethora of avenues of production and work done within an econ-
omy. It is important to note that the underlying definition builds on information from 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). It encompasses 
the added value of the manufacturing sector when the overall size of the economy is 
considered. In accordance with Gui-Diby and Renard (2015), when the level of devel-
opment in the manufacturing sector is comparatively high with regard to other sectors 
within an economy, the industrialisation rate in the country is also relatively high. With 
insight into these definitions provided, two dimensions are essential for the consolida-
tion of the industrialisation process, notably (i) the provision of incentives of production 
to the manufacturing sector and (ii) the sustainability of production in order to meet 
requirements at the local and international levels.
Having clarified the conception and definition of industrialisation, in the sections that 
follow, we discuss how linkages between various aspects of governance and capital flight 
affect industrialisation. In so doing, the related notions of governance and capital flight 
are elucidated correspondingly. Political governance, economic governance and institu-
tional governance are discussed in the first, second and third strands, respectively.
First, political governance can be defined as the election and replacement of political 
leaders (Andrés et  al. 2015). According to recent literature (Collier et  al. 2004; Davies 
2008; Ndikumana et al. 2015; Asongu and Nwachukwu 2017), the political environment 
has a substantial influence on capital flight because it is related to the damage/loss of 
assets. Accordingly, in the presence of political instability and violence, it is very likely 
that investors transfer their capital to economic environments that are associated with 
lower levels of investment risks. Furthermore, if investors think that national political 
institutions (e.g. competitive elections and executive accountability) are not favourable 
for economic performance, it is very probable that they would transfer their investments 
to other nations where political institutions are more stable and credible. A number of 
political features related to the performance of international markets and security of 
claims are contingent on international ownership (Lensink and Hermes 2000; Le and 
Zak 2006). For example, with respect to foreign direct investment (FDI), assets are con-
trolled or owned by investors in a receiving nation and long-term investment and eco-
nomic growth could be negatively affected by political risk.
In the light of the above, investors naturally react negatively to political events that, 
according to them, are unfavourable to their returns. A channel of reaction by such 
investors is disinvesting. Therefore, direct effects of political characteristics such as 
political instability, democracy and accountability influence the amount of capital that 
transits within a country. Consequently, unaccountable executives can produce unpre-
dictable investment-related policies which ultimately influence capital flight. Hence, 
political stability and non-violence can mitigate the potentially negative effect of capital 
flight on industrialisation.
Second, economic governance is the formulation and implementation of policies 
that deliver public commodities (Andrés et al. 2015). In this strand, fragile economic 
governance could result in an economic outlook that is uncertain. This uncertain 
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economic outlook discourages investors from placing their assets in the economies 
concerned. This intuition builds on the evidence that investors prefer economic cli-
mates that are associated with less uncertainty (Kelsey and le Roux 2017, 2018). From 
common sense, bad economic governance can produce substantial economic dam-
ages which affect the concerns of investors, especially with regard to the valuation 
of assets and confidence in the economic outlook. Therefore, from the perspective 
of investors, assets and money can more easily leave a nation in  situations of poor 
economic governance. Hence, bad economic governance can reduce macroeconomic 
performance and discourage capital flows owing to a blurred economic outlook. This 
is even more apparent when policies designed to deliver public goods and services are 
tailored by the elite such that they masterfully siphon and deposit stolen funds in tax 
havens. It follows from the underlying arguments that good economic governance can 
stifle capital flight that inhibits the process of industrialisation.
In the third strand, institutional governance can be understood as the respect of the 
State and citizens of institutions that govern interactions between them. On the nexus 
between capital flight and institutional governance, we argue that the rule of law and 
corruption-control affect the confidence of investors within an economy on the one 
hand, and on the other hand, the ability of officials in government to create mecha-
nisms that siphon and deposit funds in tax havens. In essence, investors are more 
likely to invest in economies in which the respect of the rule of law is optimal for 
investment. In clearer perspective, investors are likely to invest if, according to them, 
the overall economic performance of an economy cannot be weakened with State pre-
dation, regardless of whether such investors are directly influenced by such preda-
tion. The fact that investors prefer environments with more information accounting 
standards (La Porta et al. 1998), more efficient courts (Djankov et al. 2003) and bet-
ter institutions with less corrupt governments (La Porta et  al. 1999), has been con-
firmed in recent African institutional literature (Asongu 2012; Fowowe 2014; Muazu 
and Alagidede 2017). Against the backdrop of these empirical arguments, the rule of 
law enables better protection of property rights and also guarantees foreign investors 
against expropriation of their invested assets. Such expropriation encourages capital 
flight and decreases foreign investment needed for the industrialisation process. This 
logic is more apparent when countries with corrupt executives are not fully commit-
ted to respecting investors’ ownership rights.
In the light of the above arguments, the following three testable hypotheses are 
assessed within the empirical framework.
Hypothesis 1 Governance positively affects industrialisation.
Hypothesis 2 Capital flight negatively affects industrialisation.
Hypothesis 3 The negative effect of capital flight can be dampened by the positive 
effect of governance on industrialisation.
It is important to note that the first two hypotheses are expected to be valid 
because they reflect assumptions underlying the third hypothesis, which is the main 
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hypothesis of the study. In other words, Hypothesis 3 has two underpinning assump-
tions that should be validated by two prior hypotheses.
3  Data and methodology
3.1  Data
This paper investigates a panel of 36 African countries with data from 1996 to 2010.2 The 
three main sources of the data are World Bank Governance indicators for governance 
variables; a capital flight indicator from Boyce (2012), and macroeconomic indicators 
from African Development Indicators of the World Bank. The sampled countries and 
selected periodicity are constrained by data availability issues. Accordingly, the capital 
flight measurement ends in the year 2010 whilst good governance indicators are only 
available from the year 1996.
Consistent with recent literature, the adopted outcome indicator, which is industriali-
sation, is measured as the manufacturing added value at constant price as a percentage 
of GDP (see Efobi et al. 2019). This indicator of industrialisation is consistent with the 
International Standard Industrial Classification (Section D). The measurement proxies 
for productive manufacturing are units that are classified in relation to the type of prin-
cipal activity, which embodies activities that are (i) manually done (including household 
work) or (ii) done with the help of machinery that is power-tailored and factor-oriented 
(United Nations 1990). Furthermore, the suggested indicator for industrialisation has 
been preferred in recent literature (Kang and Lee 2011; UNIDO 2013; Gui-Diby and 
Renard 2015).
In accordance with recent studies (Weeks 2015; Efobi and Asongu 2016), capital flight, 
which is the main independent variable of interest, reflects unrecorded capital flows 
between a country and the rest of the world. The appreciation of such flows starts from 
inflows in foreign exchange that are acknowledged in a country’s balance of payments, 
such that the amount of currency that is missing is presented in terms of “net errors 
and omissions”. Such missing currency is also known as the disparity between recorded 
inflows and unrecorded outflows.
The main drawback in the indicator of capital flight is that it is not directly compara-
ble with other indicators, given that it is presented in terms of constant 2010 US Dol-
lars. Consistent with Asongu (2014a), the issue can be addressed in three steps. We first 
transform the current GDP into constant 2010 terms. Then, we divide the correspond-
ing value by 1,000,000 to obtain a “GDP constant of 2010 USD (in millions)”. Finally, we 
divide the capital flight data by the “GDP constant of 2010 USD (in millions)”. Ultimately, 
as shown in Appendix 2, a capital flight measurement that is comparable with other 
indicators is obtained.
The six policy explanatory governance indicators from Kaufmann et  al. (2010) are 
bundled in Sect. 3.1 through principal component analysis (PCA). The bundling exer-
cise produces (i) political governance (composed of political stability/non-violence 
and “voice and accountability”); (ii) economic governance (consisting of government 
2 The sampled 36 countries are Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, 
Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Princ-
ipe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
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effectiveness and regulation quality) and (iii) institutional governance (an embodiment 
of corruption-control and the rule of law). The six unbundled governance indicators 
from Kaufmann et al. (2010) have been used in recent governance literature (Gani 2011; 
Andrés and Asongu 2013; Yerrabati and Hawkes 2015; Andrés et  al. 2015; Oluwatobi 
et al. 2015; Ajide and Raheem 2016a, b; Asongu and Nnanna 2019; Asongu and Odhia-
mbo 2019b).
To control for omitted variable bias, five control variables are adopted, namely trade 
openness, gross fixed capital formation or domestic investment, population growth, 
financial allocation efficiency and domestic credit to the private sector. Whilst from 
intuition, positive relationships could be expected between industrialisation in the 
selected control variables; in reality, however, the expected signs are contingent on mar-
ket dynamism and expansion. For instance, if domestic investment is more related to 
education, health and social amenities, the direct impact on industrialisation may not 
be so apparent. Moreover, the shift of such domestic investment from the productive 
sector could negatively impact the industrialisation process. It is also important to note 
that a positive demographic change may not have a positive effect on industrialisation if 
the incremental demand from the population is for foreign commodities. Moreover, the 
incidence of financial development depends on the capacity of financial institutions to 
transform mobilised deposits into credit for economic operators. Accordingly, surplus 
liquidity issues which have been substantially documented in African financial institu-
tions (Saxegaard 2006; Asongu 2014b) may translate into the underlying financial devel-
opment indicators influencing industrialisation negatively. This is essentially because 
economic operators do not have access to credit for investment purposes.
3.2  Methodology
3.2.1  Principal component analysis (PCA)
This study employs PCA for the purpose of bundling the governance indicators obtained 
from Kaufmann et  al. (2010) into three main composite indicators, namely economic, 
institutional and political governance. Such an approach to bundling governance is con-
sistent with recent literature on African governance (Asongu and Nwachukwu 2016a). 
The technique consists of reducing a set of highly correlated variables into an uncor-
related set of small indicators known as principal components (PCs). The corresponding 
PCs reflect a substantial variation in information from the original dataset.
Within the PCA empirical framework, the six governance indicators are reduced into 
institutional governance, economic governance and political governance. (i) Political 
governance (consisting of voice and accountability and political stability) is the election 
and replacement of political leaders. (ii) Economic governance (a composition of regu-
lation quality and government effectiveness) is the formulation and implementation of 
policies that deliver public commodities. (iii) Institutional governance (encompassing 
the rule of law and corruption-control) is the respect by citizens and the State of institu-
tions that govern interactions between them.
The criterion for selecting the PCs is from Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002). Accord-
ing to the authors, only common factors reflecting eigenvalues higher than one or the 
mean should be retained. The findings for the PCA are presented in Table 1. The fol-
lowing can be retained in the light of the information criterion (i) political governance 
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(Polgov) which reflects about 83.50% of information from political stability and “voice 
and accountability” has an eigenvalue of 1.671; (ii) economic governance (Ecogov) 
which represents about 93.90% of information from regulation quality and govern-
ment effectiveness has an eigenvalue of 1.878 and (iii) institutional governance (Inst-
gov) which reflects approximately about 93.00% of variation in the rule of law and 
corruption-control has an eigenvalue of 1.861.
It is relevant to briefly discuss some critical concerns that may arise in regressors 
that are derived from initial regressions. As recently shown by Asongu and Nwa-
chukwu (2017) and Asongu et al. (2018), the concerns are linked to the efficiency and 
consistency of estimates on the one hand, and the validity of related inferences, on 
the other hand. In line with Pagan (1984), whilst two-step estimators are efficient and 
consistent, only few valid inferences can be apparent. This inferential caution is con-
sistent with a recent strand of literature, notably Oxley and McAleer (1993); McKen-
zie and McAleer (1997); Ba and Ng (2006), and Westerlund and Urbain (2013a).
The underlying concerns about inferential validity have been substantially engaged 
by Westerlund and Urbain (2012, 2013b), who have documented an interesting lit-
erature on concerns related to the inferential quality of PCA-augmented regressors. 
Building on a strand of past studies related to the concerns (Pesaran 2006; Stock and 
Watson 2002; Bai 2003, 2009; Greenaway-McGrevy et  al. 2012), the authors have 
established that it is possible to obtain normal inferences with PC-derived regressors, 
in so far as corresponding estimated parameters converge to their real values at the 
rate of 
√
NT  , (with T denoting the number of time series and N reflecting cross-sec-
tion observations). The authors have further articulated that, for the suggested con-
vergence to occur, T and N have to be sufficiently large. Unfortunately, how “large 
should be large” is not defined. With regard to the specific context of this study, two 
major issues confront us. N cannot be further increased because we cannot stretch 
the dataset beyond the 36 countries given data availability constraints. Moreover, T 
can only be situated between 1996 and 2010 because of two main reasons, notably the 
capital flight data in our possession ends in 2010 and good governance indicators are 
only available from 1996. In summary, valid inferences are feasible because we have 
used the maximum values of T and N available at the time of the study.
Table 1 Principal component analysis (PCA) for composite governance
PC principal component, VA voice and accountability, RL rule of law, R.Q regulation quality, GE government effectiveness, PS 
political stability, CC control of corruption, G.Gov (General Governance) first PC of VA, PS, RQ, GE, RL and CC, Polgov (Political 
Governance) first PC of VA and PS, Ecogov (Economic Governance) first PC of RQ and GE, Instgov (Institutional Governance) first 
PC of RL and CC
Principal 
components
Component matrix (loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
proportion
Eigen-value
VA PS RQ GE RL CC
First PC (Polgov) 0.707 0.707 – – – – 0.835 0.835 1.671
Second PC − 0.707 0.707 – – – – 0.164 1.000 0.328
First PC (Ecogov) – – 0.707 0.707 – – 0.939 0.939 1.878
Second PC – – − 0.707 0.707 – – 0.060 1.000 0.121
First PC (Instgov) – – – – 0.707 0.707 0.930 0.930 1.861
Second PC – – – – − 0.707 0.707 0.069 1.000 0.138
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3.2.2  Estimation technique
Five main motivations underline the choice of a Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM) as empirical strategy. Whilst the first-two are requirements for the use of the 
technique, the last-three are advantages associated with the empirical strategy. (i) The 
empirical strategy enables the control for persistence in industrialisation. This behaviour 
is apparent in the dependent variable because the correlation between industrialisation 
and its first lag (i.e. 0.961) is higher than the rule of thumb threshold of 0.800 needed 
to ascertain persistence in a dependent variable. (ii) The T (or 5) < N (or 36) criterion 
for the employment of the GMM estimation approach is met, given that the number 
of time series in each cross-section is lower than the number of cross-sections. (iii) 
The approach to estimation accounts for endogeneity in all the regressors because, on 
the one hand, simultaneity is controlled using instrumented variables and on the other 
hand, there is some bite on the unobserved heterogeneity with the use of time invariant 
indicators. (iv) Biases that are related to the difference GMM strategy are addressed with 
the system GMM empirical approach. (v) Given the panel-oriented nature of the empiri-
cal approach, cross-country variations are considered.
It is in the light of the fifth reason above that the system GMM estimator of Blundell 
and Bond (1998) and Arellano and Bover (1995) has been documented by Bond et al. 
(2001) to reflect better properties of efficiency, relative to the difference estimator (from 
Arellano and Bond 1991). The adopted approach of this study is the Roodman (2009a, b) 
extension of Arellano and Bover (1995). This approach is based on forward orthogonal 
deviations instead of first differences. This extension has better properties because it has 
been established to limit instrument proliferation and/or avoid over-identification (see 
Baltagi 2008; Love and Zicchino 2006; Boateng et al. 2018; Tchamyou et al. 2019). A two-
step specification is chosen because it controls for heteroscedasticity. Accordingly, the 
one-step approach is consistent with homoscedasticity.
The following equations in levels (1) and first difference (2) summarise the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure. In the modelling exercise, capital flight is specified 
to be one lag non-contemporary.
where Indi,t is industrialisation of country i in  period t;Indi,t−τ is industrialisation of 
country i in period t − τ ; Capi,t−τ is capital flight of country i in period t − τ ; Govi,t is 
governance (political, economic, and institutional) of country i in period t;σ0 is a con-
stant;τ represents the coefficient of auto-regression; W  is the vector of control variables 
(trade openness, domestic investment, population, bank efficiency and domestic credit), ηi 
is the country-specific effect, ξt is the time-specific constant and εi,t the error term.
(1)
Indi,t = σ0+σ1Indi,t−τ+σ2Capi,t−τ+σ3Govi,t+σ4CapGovi,t+
5∑
h=1
δhWh,i,t−τ+ηi+ξt+εi,t
(2)
Indi,t − Indi,t−τ = σ1
(
Indi,t−τ − Indi,t−2τ
)
+ σ2
(
Capi,t−τ − Capi,t−2τ
)
+ σ3
(
Govi,t −Govi,t−τ
)
+σ4
(
CapGovi,t − CapGovi,t−τ
)
+
5∑
h=1
δh
(
Wh,i,t−τ −Wh,i,t−2τ
)
+ (ξt − ξt−τ )+
(
εi,t + εi,t−τ
),
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In accordance with Brambor et  al. (2006) and Tchamyou (2019a, b), in interactive 
specifications, all constitutive terms should be incorporated regardless of the concern 
of multicollinearity. An interactive framework is also consistent with the main purpose 
of this study, notably an assessment of the role of governance in modulating the effect 
of capital flight on industrialisation. In the assessment, the net effect of capital flight on 
industrialisation is the sum of the unconditional effect of capital flight and the condi-
tional effect of capital flight (i.e. from the interaction between governance and capital 
flight).
3.2.3  Identification, simultaneity and exclusive restrictions
Discussing identification, simultaneity and exclusive restrictions is relevant for a robust 
GMM specification. From the perspective of identification, all explanatory indicators are 
predetermined or suspected endogenous and exclusively time-invariant variables are 
considered to exhibit strict exogeneity. A similar approach has been adopted in recent 
empirical literature (Dewan and Ramaprasad 2014; Asongu and Nwachukwu 2016b; 
Tchamyou and Asongu 2017). The intuition for this identification strategy is that it is 
very unlikely for time-invariant omitted indicators to reflect endogeneity in first differ-
ence (see Roodman 2009b).3
With respect to simultaneity, lagged regressors are used as instruments for for-
ward differenced indicators. Hence, Helmet transformations are also employed on 
the regressors to purge fixed effects that could influence the investigated relationships 
(Arellano and Bover 1995; Love and Zicchino 2006). The underlying transformations 
encompass the employment of forward averaged-differencing of the variables, which is 
different from the process of deducting non-contemporary observations from contem-
porary observations (see Roodman 2009b, p 104). Such transformations enable paral-
lel or orthogonal conditions between lagged values and forward-differenced indicators. 
Regardless of lag numbers, the loss of data is minimised by computing the suggested 
transformation for all observations with the exception of the last observation in cross-
sections “And because lagged observations do not enter the formula, they are valid as 
instruments” (Roodman 2009b, p 104).
From the perspective of exclusive restrictions, the adopted time-invariant indicators 
that are considered as strictly exogenous affect the outcome variable or industrialisation 
exclusively via the predetermined or suspected endogenous indicators. Furthermore, the 
statistical relevance of the exclusion restriction is assessed with the Difference in Hansen 
Test (DHT) for the validity of instruments. Accordingly, in order for the time-invariant 
indicators to elicit industrialisation exclusively via the predetermined indicators, the 
alternative hypothesis of the test should be rejected.4 With the current GMM approach, 
the information criterion used to examine if time-invariant variables exhibit strict exog-
eneity is the DHT. Hence, given the above clarification, in the findings that are reported 
3 Therefore, the approach for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv(years, eq(diff))’ whilst the gmmstyle is used for suspected 
endogenous variables.
4 It is relevant to note that in a standard Instrumental Variable (IV) approach, failure to reject the null hypothesis of the 
Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) test indicates that the instruments do not elucidate the dependent variable 
beyond suspected endogenous variables (see Beck et al. 2003; Asongu and Nwachukwu 2016c).
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in the next section, the assumption of exclusive restriction is validated if the alternative 
hypothesis of the DHT associated with IV (year, eq (diff)) is rejected.
4  Empirical results
4.1  Presentation of results
Tables  2, 3 and 4 disclose results, respectively, corresponding to political governance, 
economic governance and institutional governance. Four principal information criteria 
are employed to examine the validity of the GMM model with forward orthogonal devi-
ations.5 Based on the criteria, all the estimated models are valid. Three main dimensions 
are considered when assessing the investigated hypotheses, notably (i) Hypothesis 1 and 
Hypothesis 2 are assessed respectively with the estimated unconditional effect of govern-
ance and capital flight whereas (ii) Hypothesis 3 is examined using the net effect of the 
role of governance in dampening the unconditional effect of capital flight on industriali-
sation. Hence, the computed net effects of capital flight involve both underlying uncon-
ditional and conditional effects of capital flight.
For example, in the third column of Table 2, the unconditional and conditional effects 
of capital flight are, respectively, − 0.770 and − 0.605, whereas the corresponding net 
effect of capital flight from the interaction with political stability is − 0.376 (− 0.770 + [
− 0.605 × − 0.650]).6 Therefore, despite the unconditional positive effect of political sta-
bility on industrialisation of 5.158, political stability does not significantly dampen the 
negative effect of capital flight on industrialisation. It follows that in the light of findings 
pertaining to political stability, Hypotheses 1–2 are valid whereas Hypothesis 3 is inva-
lid. Moreover, from the results disclosed in Tables 2, 3, 4, Hypotheses 1–2 are consist-
ently valid, whereas Hypothesis 3 is consistently invalid with respect to political stability, 
political governance, government effectiveness, economic governance, corruption-con-
trol and institutional governance. Most of the significant control variables display the 
expected signs.
4.2  Discussion of results
As emphasised in the introduction, to the best of our knowledge no study has focused 
on Hypothesis 3: the role of governance (i.e. as a policy variable) in modulating the effect 
of capital flight on industrialisation. The validity of Hypotheses 1 and 2 is consistent with 
mainstream literature on the role of good governance and capital flight on industri-
alisation. This section is engaged in three main strands, notably the consistency of the 
findings in the light of extant literature; some explanations as to why Hypothesis 3 is con-
sistently invalid and caveats to the study. The three strands are expanded in chronologi-
cal order.
6 − 0.650 is the mean value of political stability.
5 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for the 
absence of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second, the Sargan and Hansen overidentification 
restrictions (OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are 
valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by 
instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. To restrict identification or limit the proliferation 
of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections in most specifications. 
Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of results 
from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a Fisher test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu 
and De Moor 2017, p 200).
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Table 2 Political governance, capital flight and industrialisation
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ 
Subsets. Dif difference, OIR over-identifying restrictions test. The italicised values have a twofold meaning: (1) The 
significance of estimated coefficients and the  Fisher statistics. (2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: (a) no 
autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; (b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. 
The mean values of political stability, voice and accountability and political governance are respectively − 0.650, − 0.705 
and − 0.098. It is important to note that whereas the sample consists of 36 African countries, 35 countries may appear in 
the regression output because of issues in degrees of freedom associated with some variables used in the conditioning 
information set. na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net effects is 
not significant
Dependent variable: industrialisation
Political stability Voice 
and accountability
Political governance
Industrialisation (− 1) 0.875*** 0.844*** 0.878*** 0.910*** 0.870*** 0.927***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 2.395 9.548*** 8.943 4.925 1.771 7.986***
(0.370) (0.000) (0.121) (0.122) (0.423) (0.000)
Political stability (PS) 1.578 5.158*** – – – –
(0.315) (0.000)
Voice and accountability (VA) – – 8.995* 6.021 – –
(0.095) (0.114)
Political governance (Polgov) – – – – 1.632 6.684***
(0.243) (0.000)
Capital flight (− 1)(CapFlight) − 0.064 − 0.770*** − 0.716 − 0.384 − 0.046 − 0.773***
(0.776) (0.002) (0.231) (0.261) (0.844) (0.000)
PolS × CapFlight − 0.164 − 0.605*** – – – –
(0.274) (0.000)
VA × CapFlight – – − 0.941* − 0.720* – –
(0.051) (0.065)
Polgov × CapFlight – – – – − 0.182 − 0.762***
(0.203) (0.000)
Trade − 0.001 0.001 − 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.008
(0.895) (0.847) (0.670) (0.215) (0.561) (0.286)
Domestic investment − 0.020** − 0.026*** − 0.019 − 0.013** − 0.020 − 0.017**
(0.020) (0.005) (0.186) (0.022) (0.107) (0.047)
Population – − 0.020*** – − 0.010** – − 0.009*
(0.000) (0.040) (0.052)
Bank efficiency – − 0.029*** – − 0.031*** – − 0.027***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Private credit – 0.119*** – 0.086*** – 0.124***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Net effects of capital flight na − 0.376 na na na − 0.698
AR(1) (0.270) (0.087) (0.268) (0.080) (0.268) (0.076)
AR(2) (0.292) (0.167) (0.291) (0.274) (0.290) (0.167)
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Hansen OIR (0.501) (0.487) (0.308) (0.558) (0.475) (0.359)
DHT for instruments
 (a) Instruments in levels (0.251) (0.771) (0.782) (0.478) (0.472) (0.975)
 H excluding group (0.648) (0.290) (0.148) (0.539) (0.433) (0.100)
Dif (null, H = exogenous)
 (b) IV (years, eq (diff )) (0.535) (0.166) (0.172) (0.412) (0.567) (0.210)
 H excluding group (0.331) (1.000) (0.884) (0.914) (0.245) (1.000)
Dif (null, H = exogenous)
 Fisher 437.17*** 1542.15*** 123.47*** 1126.33*** 335.04*** 1092.53***
 Instruments 26 38 26 38 26 38
 Countries 35 35 35 35 35 35
 Observations 323 307 323 307 323 307
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First, on the one hand, the relevance of good governance in the promotion of indus-
trialisation is consistent with a broad stream of macroeconomic- and industry-spe-
cific literature on the improvement of structural transformation in the manufacturing 
sector (Mijiyawa 2017); foreign direct investment (Rodriguez-Pose and Cols 2017) 
and technology- driven exports (Asongu and Asongu 2019), inter alia. On the other 
hand, the established unfavourable effect of capital flight on African industrialisation 
is broadly in line with a recent steam of literature on the relevance of capital flight in 
Africa’s development (Ndiaye and Siri 2016; Mpenya et al. 2016; Gankou et al. 2016).
Second, the fact that Hypothesis 3 is not validated is an indication that governance 
is a necessary but not a sufficient condition in the mitigation of the effect of capi-
tal flight on industrialisation. On the premise that knowledge-based economies are 
relevant in the drive towards industrialisation in the twenty first century (Tchamyou 
2017; Asongu and Tchamyou 2019; Asongu and Odhiambo 2020), the findings are 
consistent with Andrés et al. (2015), who have established that governance is a suf-
ficient but not a necessary condition for knowledge-based economies in Africa. By 
extension, this inference also implies that governance standards need to be improved 
to better modulate capital flight and achieve net positive effects on industrialisation. 
Policy actions that can be used to enhance good governance are discussed in the con-
cluding section.
Third, a caveat to this study is that there is homogeneity regarding the level of 
industrialisation of the 36 African countries, which may not be accurate. The issue 
can be corrected with the employment of dummy variables to differentiate the lev-
els of industrialisation in the sample and/or disaggregation of the sample into funda-
mental characteristics (such as income levels) that are exogenous to industrialisation. 
Unfortunately, the introduction of dummy variables is theoretically and empirically 
inconsistent with the GMM approach because they represent country-specific effects 
that are eliminated by first differencing to avoid endogeneity resulting from a cor-
relation between the lagged dependent variable and country-specific effects. Two 
approaches have been used to account for heterogeneity in the levels of industrialisa-
tion, notably (i) sub-sampling by income levels and levels of industrialisation and (ii) 
Quantile GMM regressions. Both approaches produce biased estimated coefficients 
owing to instrument proliferation.
The concern about instrument proliferation pertains to a situation in which after esti-
mations, it is apparent from post-estimation diagnostic tests that the number of instru-
ments in specifications is higher than the corresponding number of countries. Whilst a 
procedure of dealing with the underlying concern of instrument proliferation consists of 
collapsing instruments, from the analysis in this study, the concern of instrument prolif-
eration still persists even when the option of collapsing instruments is taken on board. 
It follows that there is a choice between substantially accounting for heterogeneity and 
having estimated coefficients that are robust. This study preferred the latter for reasons 
that are inherently associated with caveats pertaining to the adopted methodology.
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Table 3 Economic governance, capital flight and industrialisation
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ 
Subsets, Dif difference, OIR over-identifying restrictions test. The italicised values have a twofold meaning: (1) The 
significance of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. (2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: (a) no 
autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; (b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. The 
mean values of government effectiveness, regulation quality and economic governance are respectively − 0.675, − 0.663 
and 0.098. It is important to note that whereas the sample consists of 36 African countries, 35 countries may appear in 
the regression output because of issues in degrees of freedom associated with some variables used in the conditioning 
information set. na not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net effects is 
not significant
Dependent variable: industrialisation
Regulation quality Government effectiveness Economic governance
Industrialisation (− 1) 0.838*** 0.929*** 0.629*** 0.918*** 0.845*** 0.908***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 2.943 2.024 38.618*** 8.083*** 1.812 5.121**
(0.482) (0.473) (0.000) (0.008) (0.642) (0.018)
Regulation quality (RG) 0.841 0.135 – – – –
(0.746) (0.946)
Government effectiveness (GE) – – 38.184*** 8.231*** – –
(0.000) (0.006)
Economic governance (Ecogov) – – – – 2.904* 2.516*
(0.071) (0.056)
Capital flight (− 1)(CapFlight) − 0.258 − 0.259 − 3.466*** − 0.822*** − 0.181 − 0.500**
(0.480) (0.307) (0.000) (0.004) (0.602) (0.027)
RG × CapFlight − 0.120 − 0.127 – – – –
(0.637) (0.511)
GE × CapFlight – – − 3.824*** − 0.994*** – –
(0.000) (0.001)
Ecogov × CapFlight – – – – − 0.301* − 0.325**
(0.073) (0.016)
Trade 0.023** 0.027*** 0.014 0.019*** 0.032*** 0.032***
(0.014) (0.000) (0.217) (0.001) (0.007) (0.000)
Domestic investment − 0.023 − 0.002 − 0.033* − 0.009 − 0.023 − 0.019**
(0.147) (0.772) (0.091) (0.177) (0.273) (0.016)
Population – 0.0009 – − 0.005** – 0.002
(0.848) (0.045) (0.517)
Bank efficiency – − 0.038*** – − 0.032*** – − 0.033***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Private credit – 0.085*** – 0.074*** – 0.087***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Net effects of capital flight na na − 0.884 − 0.151 na − 0. 531
AR(1) (0.267) (0.082) (0.270) (0.078) (0.261) (0.078)
AR(2) (0.293) (0.348) (0.304) (0.361) (0.289) (0.322)
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hansen OIR (0.510) (0.795) (0.321) (0.737) (0.656) (0.769)
DHT for instruments
 (a) Instruments in levels
  H excluding group (0.498) (0.303) (0.316) (0.813) (0.605) (0.808)
  Dif (null, H = exogenous) (0.457) (0.921) (0.353) (0.544) (0.567) (0.592)
 (b) IV (years, eq(diff ))
  H excluding group (0.335) (0.808) (0.539) (0.557) (0.719) (0.669)
  Dif (null, H = exogenous) (0.890) (0.411) (0.103) (1.000) (0.317) (0.811)
Fisher 417.99*** 481.48*** 99.04*** 302.18*** 145.96*** 1338.42***
Instruments 26 38 26 38 26 38
Countries 35 35 35 35 35 35
Observations 323 307 322 306 322 306
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5  Concluding implications and future research directions
This study has investigated whether a potentially positive effect of governance on indus-
trialisation mitigates a potentially negative impact of capital flight on industrialisa-
tion. The focus of the study is on 36 African countries for the period 1996–2010. The 
empirical evidence is based on the Generalised Method of Moments. Three investigated 
hypothesis are examined, notably governance increases industrialisation (Hypothesis 1); 
capital flight decreases industrialisation (Hypothesis 2) and the positive effect of govern-
ance dampens the negative effect of capital flight (Hypothesis 3). Governance is bundled 
by principal component analysis, namely (i) political governance from political stability 
and “voice and accountability”; (ii) economic governance from government effectiveness 
and regulation quality and (iii) institutional governance from corruption-control and the 
rule of law. The following findings are established: Hypotheses 1–2 are consistently valid 
whereas Hypothesis 3 is consistently invalid with respect to political stability, political 
governance, government effectiveness, economic governance, corruption-control and 
institutional governance.
The main policy implication is clear and straight forward: to boost ongoing industri-
alisation efforts in Africa, the governments of sampled countries would have to increase 
their efforts towards improving good governance in view of potentially mitigating the 
adverse effect that capital flight has on industrialisation. Actions aimed at promoting 
good governance should specifically be tailored towards limiting drivers of capital flight, 
notably (i) political governance can stifle capital flight resulting from political instabil-
ity and the absence of accountability; (ii) economic governance can reduce capital flight 
resulting from economic instability, imposition of capital controls, currency devalua-
tion, government ineffectiveness and poor regulation quality and (iii) institutional gov-
ernance can mitigate capital resulting from corruption and disrespect of the rule of law. 
Such governance mechanisms should entail improvements in, inter alia: participation; 
technical and managerial competence; transparency and open information systems, and 
organisational capacity.
Beyond policy implications, the scholarly contribution of this study also builds on 
the fact that we have shown that, to avoid conceptual conflation, perceptual bias and 
misleading policy inferences, the terminology used in identifying governance variables 
should be consistent with the measurement of the corresponding governance variables. 
For instance, Kangoye (2013) has employed “corruption-control” interchangeably with 
“governance”. Furthermore, the notions of political governance, economic governance 
and institutional governance have been employed in the literature without statistical 
validity (Kurtz and Schrank 2007a, b; Kaufmann et al. 2007a, b). Hence, in the light of 
the established findings, the term “economic governance” cannot be employed unless 
it is a composite measurement of government effectiveness and regulation quality. We 
have also shown that a dimension of governance may be driven exclusively by one of 
its components. Moreover, our findings have complemented recent capital flight lit-
erature which has largely focused on the relationship between capital flight and natu-
ral resources in Cameroon (Mpenya et al. 2016); the relationship between capital flight 
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Table 4 Institutional governance, capital flight and industrialisation
*,**,***significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ 
Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test.  The italicised values have a twofold meaning: (1) The 
significance of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. (2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of (a) no 
autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and (b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. 
The mean values of the rule of law, corruption-control and institutional governance are respectively − 0.716, − 0.598 
and − 0.006. It is important to note that whereas the sample consists of 36 African countries, 35 countries may appear in 
the regression output because of issues in degrees of freedom associated with some variables used in the conditioning 
information set. na not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net effects is 
not significant
Dependent variable: industrialisation
Rule of law Corruption-control Institutional 
governance
Industrialisation (− 1) 0.822*** 0.960*** 0.772*** 0.872*** 0.794*** 0.911***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 8.551 2.123 18.086* 8.090** 3.393 6.160***
(0.159) (0.441) (0.065) (0.030) (0.432) (0.002)
Rule of law (RL) 7.499*** 2.802 – – – –
(0.072) (0.237)
Corruption-Control (CC) – – 18.161** 5.989 – –
(0.047) (0.132)
Institutional governance (Instgov) – – – – 3.028 4.174***
(0.144) (0.001)
Capital flight (− 1)(CapFlight) − 0.618 − 0.204 − 1.511* − 0.552 − 0.217 − 0.426**
(0.273) (0.498) (0.098) (0.138) (0.556) (0.025)
RL × CapFlight − 0.762* − 0.415 – – – –
(0.066) (0.111)
CC × CapFlight – – − 1.807** − 0.676 – –
(0.045) (0.100)
Instgov × CapFlight – – – – − 0.309 − 0.495***
(0.127) (0.000)
Trade 0.004 0.009 − 0.001 0.008* 0.023** 0.003
(0.586) (0.186) (0.904) (0.072) (0.030) (0.435)
Domestic investment − 0.032* − 0.010 − 0.018 − 0.031*** − 0.030 − 0.014**
(0.058) (0.148) (0.358) (0.000) (0.102) (0.034)
Population – − 0.008** – − 0.011*** – − 0.012***
(0.012) (0.005) (0.000)
Bank efficiency – − 0.037*** – − 0.037*** – − 0.033***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Private credit – 0.100*** – 0.074*** – 0.101***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Net effects of capital flight na na − 3.916 na na − 0.423
AR(1) (0.272) (0.080) (0.268) (0.085) (0.271) (0.086)
AR(2) (0.298) (0.241) (0.291) (0.430) (0.298) (0.230)
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hansen OIR (0.354) (0.644) (0.396) (0.674) (0.540) (0.591)
DHT for instruments
 (a) Instruments in levels
  H excluding group (0.536) (0.522) (0.644) (0.766) (0.711) (0.852)
  Dif (null, H = exogenous) (0.267) (0.615) (0.263) (0.495) (0.374) (0.345)
 (b) IV (years, eq (diff ))
  H excluding group (0.357) (0.452) (0.398) (0.489) (0.550) (0.409)
  Dif (null, H = exogenous) (0.353) (1.000) (0.364) (1.000) (0.381) (1.000)
Fisher 132.67*** 3538.10*** 124.32*** 2259.14*** 203.33*** 1690.12***
Instruments 26 38 26 38 26 38
Countries 35 35 35 35 35 35
Observations 323 307 322 306 322 306
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and fiscal policy (Muchai and Muchai 2016); drivers of capital flight in Ethiopia (Geda 
and Yimer 2016) and Madagascar (Ramiandrisoa and Rakotomanana 2016); linkages 
between capital flight and tax revenue in Burkina Faso (Ndiaye and Siri 2016); public 
social spending and capital flight in Congo-Brazzaville (Moulemvo 2016); trade misin-
voicing and capital flight in Zimbabwe (Kwaramba et  al. 2016) and lessons from case 
studies on the causes and consequences of capital flight (Ndikumana 2016).
It is relevant to also clarify that the recommendation to boost good governance in 
order to mitigate capital flight and enhance industrialisation also builds on the fact that 
governance standards in Africa are comparatively low relative to other continents of the 
world. This is also apparent from the summary statistics in Appendix 2 in which, the 
mean values of governance dynamics are negative on the one hand and on the other 
hand, for the respective governance dynamics, the minimum negative values are higher 
than the corresponding maximum positive values. Hence, the unexpected findings can 
also be traceable to the inherent poor governance in the continent which is reflected in 
the negative skewness of the attendant governance dynamics.
Future research can focus on investigating the relevance of the established findings on 
industrialisation when the outcome variable is assessed throughout the conditional dis-
tribution of industrialisation. The motivation for this future research recommendation is 
that the role of governance in dampening capital flight to boost industrialisation may be 
contingent on existing levels of industrialisation. Moreover, it is worthwhile to assess if 
the established findings withstand empirical scrutiny when industry-specific governance 
indicators are involved.
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Table 5 Definitions of variables
WDI World Bank Development Indicators, PCA principal component analysis, UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development, ISICD International Standard Industrial Classification (Section D)
Variables Signs Definitions of variables (measurements) Sources
Industrialisation Industria Manufacturing (ISICD) UNCTAD
Capital flight Capf. Logarithm of capital flight (constant of 2010) Ndikumana and Boyce (2012)
Political stability PS “Political stability/no violence (estimate): 
measured as the perceptions of the likelihood 
that the government will be destabilised or 
overthrown by unconstitutional and violent 
means, including domestic violence and 
terrorism”
World Bank (WDI)
Voice and account-
ability
VandA “Voice and accountability (estimate): measures 
the extent to which a country’s citizens are 
able to participate in selecting their govern-
ment and to enjoy freedom of expression, 
freedom of association and a free media”
World Bank (WDI)
Political governance Polgov First principal component of political stability 
and voice and accountability. The process 
by which those in authority are selected and 
replaced
PCA
Government effective-
ness
Gov. E “Government effectiveness (estimate): measures 
the quality of public services, the quality and 
degree of independence from political pres-
sures of the civil service, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of governments’ commitments to 
such policies”
World Bank (WDI)
Regulation quality RQ “Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the 
ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations 
that permit and promote private sector 
development”
World Bank (WDI)
Economic governance Ecogov “First principal component of government 
effectiveness and regulation quality. The 
capacity of government to formulate and 
implement policies, and to deliver services”
PCA
Rule of law RL “Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of 
the extent to which agents have confidence 
in and abide by the rules of society and in 
particular the quality of contract enforce-
ment, property rights, the police, the courts, 
as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence”
World Bank (WDI)
Corruption-control CC “Control of corruption (estimate): captures 
perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including 
both petty and grand forms of corruption, 
as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and 
private interests”
World Bank (WDI)
Institutional govern-
ance
Instgov First principal component of rule of law and 
Corruption-control. The respect for citizens 
and the state of institutions that govern the 
interactions amongst them
PCA
Bank efficiency BcBd Bank credit to bank deposits (%) World Bank (WDI)
Domestic credit Domcred Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI)
Trade Trade Exports and imports of goods and services (% 
of GDP)
World Bank (WDI)
Domestic investment GFCF Gross fixed capital formation (including Acquisi-
tions less disposals of valuables) (% of GDP)
World Bank (WDI)
Population Pop Population (in millions) World Bank (WDI)
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Appendix 2
See Table 6.
Appendix 3
See Table 7.
Table 6 Summary statistics (1996–2010)
SD standard deviation
Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations
Industrialisation 11.355 6.699 2.207 36.858 528
Capital flight 9.934 0.784 6.816 12.333 417
Political stability − 0.650 0.952 − 2.986 1.188 432
Voice and accountability − 0.705 0.637 − 1.885 0.932 432
Political governance − 0.098 1.243 − 2.974 2.709 432
Government effectiveness − 0.675 0.547 − 1.974 0.727 431
Regulation quality − 0.663 0.535 − 2.412 0.791 432
Economic governance 0.098 1.146 − 3.284 3.276 431
Rule of law − 0.716 0.626 − 2.207 0.773 432
Control of corruption − 0.598 0.562 − 2.057 1.249 431
Institutional governance − 0.006 1.287 − 3.139 3.676 395
Bank efficiency 67.069 28.572 13.753 164.618 517
Domestic credit 16.596 15.036 0.198 103.632 511
Trade openness 69.974 39.783 0.000 225.043 540
Gross fixed capital formation 21.031 9.398 2.000 63.698 528
Population 20.97 26.681 0.077 159.424 540
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